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Abstract
We provide an economic basis for permitting freezeouts of non-tendering share-
holders following successful takeovers. We describe a specific freezeout mechanism
based on easily verifiable information that induces desirable efficiency and welfare
properties in models of both corporations with widely dispersed shareholdings and
corporations with large pivotal shareholders. The mechanism dominates previous
proposals along some important dimensions. We also examine takeover premia that
arise in the presence of competition among raiders. Our mechanism is closely related
to the practice of takeover law in the U.S.; thus, our analysis may be thought of as
analyzing the economic foundations of current regulations.
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Grossman and Hart (1980) point out that free-riding considerations could thwart take-
overs of widely-held corporations where each shareholder is negligibly small. Anticipating
that the post-takeover value of the raider-run firm will exceed the tender price, target
shareholders prefer holding on to their shares and free-riding on the raider’s improvement
in firm value to tendering. Thus, no shareholder tenders and raids fail even if they are value-
increasing. Grossman and Hart argue that to enable takeovers to succeed, an exclusionary
mechanism is needed that deters free-riding by “punishing” non-tendering shareholders.
The economic desirability of an exclusionary mechanism depends on more than just
its deterrence of free-riding. By influencing the likelihood of successful takeovers, the
mechanism affects the incentives of raiders to mount takeovers and of incumbent managers
to generate firm value and so determines overall welfare. Efficiency considerations further
demand that an exclusionary device promote value-enhancing takeovers (those where the
value of the raider-run firm exceeds the value under current management) and discourage
value-decreasing ones. These issues were at the heart of the Grossman-Hart analysis but
have received little attention in the subsequent literature; we return to them in this paper.
We consider an exclusionary mechanism that is based on a particular “freezeout” of non-
tendering shareholders. Under our rule, in the event of a successful takeover, non-tendering
shareholders receive the maximum of two values: (a) the target company’s share price
immediately prior to the tender offer, and (b) the tender offer itself. This simple rule has
several valuable properties. First, it induces a unique equilibrium whose outcomes coincide
in all respects with those resulting under the optimal dilution mechanism of Grossman and
Hart. Second, the two values required for its implementation, the offer price and the stock
price, are observable and verifiable. Third, it is consistent with the law and practice of
actual tender offers in the U.S.; indeed, our analysis may be viewed as an examination of
the economic underpinnings of the U.S. legal structure governing takeovers.
Our analysis begins with the framework of Grossman and Hart (1980) who consider a
firm with widely dispersed shareholdings. The only exogenous variable in this model is the
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ex ante distribution of values of the firm under the raider’s control. Other quantities—
the firm value under incumbent management, the probability of a successful raid, and the
firm’s pre-offer share price—are determined endogenously as functions of the exclusionary
device. Grossman and Hart propose an exclusionary device based on dilution: A successful
raider may transfer to himself a fixed dollar amount from the post-takeover firm value. If
dilution lowers the residual value of the firm below the tender price, free-riding is inhibited.
Grossman and Hart identify and characterize the optimal level of dilution in the model.
We show that our freezeout rule induces a unique equilibrium in this model whose
outcomes coincide in all respects with those resulting under the optimal dilution mechanism
of Grossman and Hart. In particular, takeovers succeed when, and only when, they are
value-enhancing; and the same ex ante firm value results as under the optimal dilution
mechanism.
The Grossman-Hart mechanism, however, has three important shortcomings that are
not present in our solution. First, to ensure that shareholders do not tender at any price,
such as below the firm’s value under incumbent management, Grossman and Hart impose
an ad-hoc lower bound on admissible tender offers. This bound eliminates inefficient value-
reducing takeovers by its very definition, but it depends on information that is unverifiable,
and arguably even unobservable, by a third party such as a court of law. Absent this bound,
new equilibria arise that are inefficient. Multiplicity of equilibria also creates ambiguity
in defining a single optimal level of dilution: What level is optimal will depend on which
equilibrium is actually played.
Second, even if the lower bound on admissible offers is preserved, Bagnoli and Lip-
man (1988) show that if conditional and restricted tender offers are considered, the Gross-
man-Hart mechanism admits inefficient equilibria in which value-reducing takeovers can
succeed. Intuitively, dilution enables a wealth transfer from minority shareholders to the
raider that could be used to subsidize payments to tendering shareholders. Such inefficien-
cies cannot arise under our rule since non-tendering shareholders receive at least as much
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in the freezeout as those who tender. Third, the form of dilution proposed by Grossman
and Hart is infeasible in practice since it is in violation of U.S. law.
Our rule is notably more “benevolent” to target firm shareholders than the Grossman-
Hart mechanism which works by threatening non-tendering shareholders with dilution of
their post-takeover wealth. Such threats create what Bebchuk and Hart (2001) call “pres-
sure to tender” and could lead to excessive tendering. The lower bound on offers imposed
by Grossman and Hart is precisely to counteract this effect. In contrast, our rule does not
penalize non-tendering shareholders compared to those who tender; rather, it eliminates
free-riding by limiting the gains to not tendering.
We also examine the impact of our freezeout mechanism on modifications of the Gross-
man-Hart framework that have been proposed in the literature. These include large share-
holdings (Bagnoli and Lipman (1988)), asymmetric information concerning the value of a
raider-run firm (Shleifer and Vishny (1986)), post-takeover moral hazard (Burkart, Gromb,
and Panunzi (1998)), and risk-arbitrage (Cornelli and Li (2001)). In each case, it was
shown that free-riding can be resolved without exclusion, but that outcomes without ex-
clusion may be inefficient. We find that when freezeouts are introduced into these models,
the modifications have no effect; in each case there is a unique equilibrium which is also
efficient.
A counterfactual implication of introducing our freezeout rule into the Grossman-Hart
model and its modifications is that the takeover premium is zero in equilibrium. (The
Grossman-Hart dilution mechanism also carries this implication.) In the final part of the
paper, we examine the Fishman (1989) model of competition among several raiders. Pre-
emptive bidding by the first raider, and Bertrand competition among raiders if more than
one raider enters, results in a positive takeover premium in equilibrium. Reflecting the
expected takeover premium, the firm’s pre-offer share price exceeds its value under current
management. Efficiency demands, however, that takeovers succeed whenever the raider-
run firm is worth more than firm value under current management. Thus, an exclusionary
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device can be efficient only if it allows some takeovers to succeed even at prices below
the pre-offer share price, that is, at a negative takeover premium. Since negative takeover
premia are unreasonable, we propose an alternative criterion of constrained efficiency. An
exclusionary mechanism is constrained-efficient if takeover attempts are made and succeed
whenever a raider values the firm at more than its pre-offer share price. We show that the
freezeout mechanism is constrained efficient.
Freezeouts have been incorporated in other models in the literature. Fishman (1989)
looks at a setting with multiple raiders and assumes that shareholders tender to the raider
offering the higher price provided this price exceeds a threshold level. Formally incor-
porating freezeouts into his model would result in identical equilibria as Fishman recog-
nizes (see his footnote 4). More recently, Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1998), Ravid
and Spiegel (1999) and Gomes (2001) have all studied models with freezeouts.1 Burkart,
Gromb and Panunzi examine a model with post-takeover moral hazard; we discuss their
paper in Section IV. Ravid and Spiegel are concerned with the optimal toehold acquisition
strategy in a model where rival bidders could enter. Gomes studies the takeover premium
in a setting which endogenizes the entry of risk-arbitrageurs and their holdings.2
The objectives of these papers differ from ours. Fishman, Ravid and Spiegel, and
Gomes each take the freezeout rule as given and employ it in deriving their results. Their
primary concern is not with the welfare/efficiency implications of the rule as compared to
other exclusionary mechanisms, but on other issues; e.g., Gomes considers the effect on
the takeover premium of the majority needed to effect a freezeout. Our paper studies the
optimality of freezeouts as a mechanism for mitigating free-riding and characterizes its ex
ante and ex post effects.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section I presents the model. Sec-
tion II derives the equilibrium under our freezeout mechanism and discusses its properties
in the original model and extensions. Section III presents the Grossman-Hart mechanism
and compares it to ours. Section IV examines the issue of takeover premia. Section V pro-
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vides a description of US takeover law and relates our freezeout rule to the law. Section VI
concludes.
I. The Basic Model
Our basic model is essentially the framework of Grossman and Hart (1980). We consider
a firm with a large number of individually negligible shareholders. In determining their
response to the raider’s tender offer, shareholders ignore the impact of their own actions
on overall outcomes.
The firm is potentially a takeover target.3 The cost to the raider of mounting the raid
is denoted c. The takeover is successful if at least 50 percent of the shares are tendered to
the raider. In the event of a successful takeover, the value of the raider-run firm is v (all
values are in per-share terms). Ex ante, v and c are random variables with exogenously
given distributions, but by the time of the takeover bid, their realizations are known and
are common knowledge.4
The value of the firm under current management, denoted q, is determined as a function
of the actions of the firm’s manager before the raider’s tender offer is made. These actions
depend on the likelihood of a successful takeover and are chosen with knowledge of the
distribution (but not the realizations) of v and c. Specifically, there is a set of actions A
available to the manager, and action a ∈ A leads to the value q(a) for the firm and the
utility level u(a) for the manager. We rewrite the manager’s utility directly as a function
of q by defining5
U(q) = max{u(a) | q(a) = q}. (1)
U is assumed to be continuous as a function of q. In the event of a takeover, the manager
suffers a utility loss. His utility in this case is denoted U0; without loss of generality, we
take U0 = 0. Thus, if pi denotes the probability of a successful takeover, the manager’s
expected utility is
EU(q) = (1− pi)U(q). (2)
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The manager sets q to maximize his expected utility. This is a non-trivial problem
since pi itself depends on q: ceteris paribus, a higher q reduces the likelihood of a successful
takeover. In addition, pi also depends on the distribution of the variables v and c, and on
the exclusionary mechanism in place that determines payoffs to non-tendering shareholders
in the event of a takeover (see below). The manager takes these dependencies into account
in determining q.
A. Takeover Offers and Exclusion
The tender price offered by the raider is denoted p. In this initial segment, we focus on
“any-and-all” offers in which the raider agrees to buy the shares tendered by any shareholder
at the offered tender price of p regardless of how many others tender.6
Consider the outcome for a shareholder who does not tender. If the takeover attempt
fails, the current management remains in charge, and a non-tendering shareholder re-
ceives q. If the attempt succeeds, payoffs depend on the exclusionary mechanism in place;
this mechanism specifies how non-tendering shareholders are treated following a successful
takeover. Absent any exclusionary mechanism, a non-tendering shareholder participates
fully in the post-takeover value of the firm and receives v. At the opposite extreme, if
the exclusionary mechanism allows total dilution of non-tendering shareholders, the latter
receive nothing. At this point, we make no specific assumptions regarding exclusion.
Given an exclusionary mechanism, shareholders compare the value of tendering to not
tendering and choose the action with the higher value. If shareholders are indifferent, then
either action is optimal, and we make no special assumptions concerning their behavior in
this case.
B. Pre-Takeover Share Prices
Given a choice of q, the pre-takeover market price of the firm’s shares, denoted r,
is determined as a function of: the value of the firm q under current management; the
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probability of a successful takeover pi; the probability θ that a tender offer is made which is
unsuccessful; the payoffs received by the shareholders in the event of a successful takeover
(which depends on the exclusionary mechanism); and the payoffs received by shareholders
in the event of an unsuccessful tender offer (which is p for the shareholders who tender and
q for those who do not). We assume that the market is risk-neutral with respect to the
activities of the firm; thus, r is given by
r = (1− pi − θ) q + θE[Shareholder payoffs || unsuccessful tender offer]
+pi E[Shareholder payoffs || successful tender offer].
(3)
Note that r is the share price of the firm before it is known whether a takeover will occur.
C. Ex-Ante Firm Value
The value of the firm is given by q if there is no successful takeover and by v if there is a
successful takeover. Since resources of c are consumed in the takeover process, the ex-ante
value of the firm net of takeover costs is given by
R = (1− pi − θ) q + θ(q − c) + pi E[v − c || takeover is successful] (4)
In the sequel, we refer to (4) as simply the ex-ante firm value. Grossman and Hart refer
to (4) as a measure of “social welfare.”
D. Efficiency
An exclusionary mechanism is (ex-post) efficient if and only if all value-enhancing
takeovers succeed, i.e., takeovers are attempted and succeed whenever v − c > q and
no takeovers are attempted when v − c < q. At the “indifference” point v − c = q, it
makes no difference for efficiency if takeovers are attempted and succeed or if they are not
attempted.
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E. Verifiability
To ensure implementability of an exclusionary mechanism, we require it to be based
only on verifiable information. This means that while the mechanism may depend on the
share price r (which, in turn, depends on the mechanism), it cannot depend directly on q
or v. As a first step, we examine outcomes when there is no exclusionary mechanism.
F. The Free-Rider Problem
When there is no exclusionary device, we obtain the free-rider problem of Grossman
and Hart (1980):7
Proposition 1 [The Free-Rider Problem]: For any c > 0, there is no rational expectations
equilibrium in which takeover attempts are made and succeed with certainty.
Proof: If p < v, a shareholder who believes the raid will succeed is better off not
tendering his shares. But then no shareholder tenders, so the raid fails. An offer p ≥ v
leads to a loss for the raider since c > 0, so such an offer will not be made.
Proposition 1 has been interpreted as an argument that exclusion is necessary for
takeovers of widely held corporations to succeed, but, as Bagnoli and Lipman (1988) point
out, this is problematic. While raids cannot succeed with certainty without exclusion, they
cannot fail with certainty either if p > q since a shareholder who believes the raid will fail
with certainty is better off tendering and receiving p. If shareholders randomize, outcomes
may be deterministic (if an analog of the strong law of large numbers holds) or stochastic
(Feldman and Gilles (1985) and Judd (1985) show that a continuum of iid random variables
may generate stochastic outcomes). In the former case, the game has no equilibrium at all,
so it does not mean much that there is no equilibrium with successful takeovers. In the
latter, takeovers succeed probabilistically, and Bagnoli and Lipman show that the raider
makes strictly positive profits in equilibrium.
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Free-riding and exclusion have nonetheless remained major concerns of researchers since
Grossman and Hart. In the sections following, we present our proposed solution and con-
trast it with other proposals.
II. A Freezeout-Based Resolution
In a freezeout, the shares of non-tendering shareholders are bought out by the raider
following a successful takeover at a price determined by pre-specified rules. In this paper,
we propose the following freezeout rule: in the event of a successful bid, non-tendering
shareholders receive
max{r, p}, (5)
where p is the tender price and r is the firm’s pre-offer share-price. This rule is based on
observable and verifiable information.8 In Section V, we show that it is consistent with the
law and reflects the payoffs received in the US by non-tendering shareholders. A related
rule that has been posited (e.g., Gomes (2001)) is that non-tendering shareholders receive
p in a freezeout; we comment on the differences in Section II.C below. Our focus in this
section and the next is on the theoretical properties of using (5) as an exclusionary device.
We begin with its implications for efficiency of outcomes.
A. The Freezeout Rule and Efficiency
Proposition 2: Equilibrium outcomes under (5) are efficient. In particular, takeover at-
tempts are made and succeed when v − c > q, and no takeover attempts are made when
v − c < q.
Proof: We first take r and q as given, look at the offer/tendering subgame and show
that we must have p = r = q in equilibrium. Then, using this, we show that in equilibrium
the raider makes a tender offer and the tender offer succeeds with certainty when v− c > q
and that the raider makes no tender offer when v − c < q.
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Let r and q be given. Under (5), an offer p < min{r, q} can never be part of an
equilibrium: No shareholder will tender since accepting results in a payoff of p, but not
tendering leads to either q (if the offer fails) or max{r, p} = r (if it succeeds). If an
offer p > max{r, q} is made, the unique continuation equilibrium outcome is for the raid
to succeed. However, such an offer cannot be part of an equilibrium either because for
any such p, there is p′ such that max{r, q} < p′ < p which also succeeds with certainty
and which is preferable for the raider. Thus, any equilibrium offer p lies in the interval
[min{r, q},max{r, q}].
Consider any equilibrium. Let pi be the probability of a successful takeover in equilib-
rium and let θ be the probability that an offer is made that is unsuccessful. Then, the
equilibrium share price r is given by (3). Since the tender offer in equilibrium lies in the
interval [min{r, q},max{r, q}], so too do shareholders’ payoffs in a successful tender offer.
In an unsuccessful tender offer, shareholders who tender receive p and those who do not
receive q; once again, therefore, all shareholders’ payoffs lie in the same interval. Using the
upper-bounds in (3), we have
r ≤ (1− pi − θ) q + (pi + θ) max{r, q}, (6)
which implies r ≤ q. Using the lower bounds in (3), we also have
r ≥ (1− pi − θ) q + (pi + θ) min{r, q}, (7)
which implies r ≥ q. Thus, r = q, which means in equilibrium we must have p = r = q.
Now, note that the raider will make a tender offer of p only if v − c ≥ p, since a
successful tender offer is unprofitable otherwise. We first show that when v − c > p,
the raider’s equilibrium offer of p (= r = q) succeeds with certainty, i.e., θ = 0. To
this end, note that when the offer succeeds, the raider’s payoff is v − c − p, and when
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it fails, the raider’s payoff is −c. Thus, the raider’s expected payoff from the offer p is
(1− θ)(v − c− p)− θc = (1− θ)(v − p)− c.
Suppose θ > 0. Pick any  such that 0 <  < θ(v − p) and suppose the raider instead
makes a tender offer of p′ = p + . Since p′ > max{r, q}, the unique equilibrium outcome
is that the raid succeeds with certainty, so the raider’s payoff is v − c − p′ which strictly
dominates the payoff from making a tender offer of p. This contradicts the definition of p as
an equilibrium offer and establishes that in equilibrium tender offers succeed with certainty
when v − c > p.
When v − c = p, there are two equilibria possible. In one, the raider makes a tender
offer of p and the raid succeeds with certainty. Note that it cannot be an equilibrium in
this case for the raider to enter if he anticipates the raid failing with positive probability
since the raider’s payoff then is (1− θ)(v− c−p)− θc = −θc < 0. In the other equilibrium,
anticipating failure of the raid, the raider does not make a tender offer.
Summing up, we have the following: (a) If v − c > q, the raider makes a bid of p = q,
and the bid succeeds, (b) if v − c < q, no takeover bid is mounted, and (c) if v − c = q,
either a takeover attempt is made that succeeds with certainty or no takeover attempt is
made. This completes the proof of the proposition.
Note that in all successful takeovers in Proposition 2, shareholders are indifferent be-
tween tendering and not tendering their shares. Takeovers succeed in these cases not
because we assume that shareholders tender when they are indifferent, but because ten-
dering is an equilibrium outcome under our freezeout rule (5). Secondly, if (as is common
in practice) the tender offer is any-and-all conditional on at least 50 percent tendering, the
proof of Proposition 2 remains valid and even gets simplified since all shareholders then
receive q if the takeover fails. Two further remarks are important:
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Remark 1 The proof makes no use of the assumption that shareholders are atomistic.
Thus, the equilibrium is unchanged even if there are (possibly many) large shareholdings.
Remark 2 The equilibrium is unaffected by whether v is common or private knowledge.
Under (5), tendering shareholders receive p while non-tendering shareholders receive ei-
ther max{r, p} (if the raid succeeds) or q (if it fails). These payoffs do not depend on
shareholders’ estimates of v, so neither will their acceptance/rejection decision.
In the next subsection, we draw on these observations to comment on some extensions
of the Grossman and Hart model studied in the literature. We close this subsection by
completing the description of equilibrium under (5). For expositional simplicity, we will
assume as in Grossman-Hart that at the indifference point v − c = q, the raider does not
enter. From the proof of Proposition 2, the equilibrium probability of a successful takeover,
given q, is
pi(q) = Prob {(v, c) || v − c > q}. (8)
Thus, the incumbent manager of the firm picks q to solve
max
q∈R
(1− pi(q))U(q). (9)
The solution q∗ to (9) is the equilibrium firm value under incumbent management. From (8),
the equilibrium probability pi∗ of a successful takeover is pi∗ = pi(q∗). This now determines
the level of ex-ante firm value R∗ in the equilibrium as
R∗ = [1− pi∗] q∗ + pi∗E[v − c || v − c > q∗]. (10)
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Section III relates these outcomes to Grossman and Hart’s optimal dilution level.
B. Further Implications of the Freezeout Rule
It has been shown in the literature that such factors as large shareholdings, asymmetric
information and risk-arbitrage can resolve the free-rider problem without exclusion but
may create inefficiency in outcomes. Since freezeouts are in fact admitted by US law, we
examine the impact of these factors under (5). We find that none of these factors now has
an impact: equilibria with and without these factors coincide and are efficient. A short
discussion follows.
Bagnoli and Lipman (1988) show that if the set of shareholders is finite, there are
always Nash equilibria of the game without exclusion in which takeovers succeed (see also
Bebchuk (1989)). However, there are multiple equilibria, some of which are in mixed-
strategies. Under the latter, outcomes are stochastic so value-increasing takeovers fail with
positive probability. Proposition 2 and Remark 1 show that the freezeout rule (5) eliminates
such inefficiencies and unambiguously improves outcomes.
In Shleifer and Vishny (1986), the raider is also the sole large shareholder and there
is asymmetric information between the raider and the other shareholders about v. The
raider’s being a large shareholder helps resolve the free-rider problem without exclusion,
but asymmetric information creates possible inefficiencies in outcomes. Remarks 1 and 2
show that if the freezeout rule (5) is introduced into this model, neither factor matters and
outcomes are efficient.
Cornelli and Li (2001) endogenize the presence of large shareholders by having risk-
arbitrageurs acquire blocks. They show that this resolves the free-rider problem, but out-
comes may be inefficient because risk-arbitrageurs fail with positive probability to acquire
the necessary stake for the takeover to succeed. Under the freezeout rule (5), however,
risk-arbitrage has no role in their model and inefficiency vanishes.
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The case of Burkart, Gromb, and Panunizi (1998), who study a model with post-takeover
moral hazard, is more complex. We comment on their paper in detail in Section IV.
C. Related Freezeout Rules
An alternative freezeout rule mentioned in the literature is where non-tendering share-
holders can be bought out at p rather than max{r, p}. This makes inefficient outcomes
theoretically possible: In addition to the equilibrium identified in Proposition 2 (which
remains an equilibrium here), it is readily seen that there is a second equilibrium in which
all shareholders tender at any offer p (including those below q). The lower bound of r in
our rule eliminates this equilibrium. Intuitively, as the proof of Proposition 2 shows, this
bound forces r up to at least q, so an offer which exceeds r also exceeds q and value-reducing
takeovers are avoided.
These observations indicate that it is the presence of r (rather than p) in the freezeout
mechanism that ensures efficiency in our basic model, and indeed, it is easy to check that
Proposition 2 is unaffected if non-tendering shareholders are frozen out at the pre-offer share
price r rather than at max{r, p}. (This point was raised by the referee.) For these two
freezeout rules to produce different equilibria, two conditions must hold simultaneously
in equilibrium: (i) p > r, as happens when there are multiple raiders competing (see
Section IV), and (ii) at least some shareholders do not tender in successful takeovers and
receive the lower compensation r as a consequence. Under rational expectations, the second
condition requires frictions that take us beyond the scope of this paper.9
III. The Grossman–Hart Dilution Mechanism
This section examines the exclusion device of Grossman and Hart (1980). We look
mainly at any-and-all offers, the setting of the Grossman-Hart model, and identify weak-
nesses of the Grossman-Hart rule that do not arise under our freezeout rule. At the end of
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the section, we note a further weakness of the Grossman-Hart rule pointed out by Bagnoli
and Lipman (1988) in the context of restricted offers and show that this problem too does
not arise under our rule.
The Grossman-Hart device works by dilution: A successful raider may transfer an
amount φ from the firm to himself, reducing the post-takeover firm value to max{v−φ, 0}.
Thus, shareholders tender if
p ≥ max{v − φ, 0}. (11)
Grossman and Hart then impose an additional constraint on admissible tender offers which
eliminates one form of inefficiency by definition:
p ≥ q. (12)
From (11) and (12), a successful bid must satisfy p ≥ max{v − φ, q}. It is easily seen that
if min{φ, v− q} > c, there is a unique rational expectations equilibrium in which the raider
makes an offer of p = max{v − φ, q} and all shareholders tender. The raider’s net profit is
v −max{v − φ, q} − c = min{φ, v − q} − c. (13)
Thus, dilution resolves the free-rider problem. The choice of φ affects equilibrium
outcomes through its impact on the probability pi of a successful raid and on the choice of
q by incumbent management. From (13), the probability of a successful raid given φ and
q, is
pi(φ, q) = Prob {(v, c) | min(φ, v − q) > c}. (14)
The firm value q under incumbent management is determined as
q(φ) = argmax
q
(1− pi(φ, q))U(q), (15)
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and the ex-ante firm value given φ resolves as
R(φ) = [1− pi(φ, q(φ))] q(φ) + pi E[v − c || min{φ, v − q(φ)} > c]. (16)
Grossman and Hart (1980) establish the central result that
Proposition 3: The values q and R are both maximized at φ = +∞.
Proof: See Grossman and Hart (1980, Proposition 1, p.51, and Proposition 5, p.55).
Proposition 3 shows that ex ante firm value optimality is achieved when the raider
can divert the entire post-takeover value of the target firm to himself. Outcomes are also
efficient with φ =∞: The raider then bids p = q in any takeover attempt, and the attempt
succeeds with certainty; from (13), this is profitable for the raider if and only if v − c > q.
However, this solution to the free-rider problem has an important weakness: It is incon-
sistent with observed behavior and violative of the law. The following result is, therefore,
of interest. It shows that our solution, which is legally admissible, produces equilibrium
outcomes that are literally identical to the optimal Grossman-Hart dilution rule.
Proposition 4: Let q(∞) and R(∞) denote the equilibrium values of q and R in the
Grossman and Hart optimal solution. Then, q(∞) = q∗ and R(∞) = R∗, where q∗ and R∗
are the equilibrium values under the freezeout rule (5) identified in (9) and (10), respectively.
Proof: With φ = +∞ and any q, the probability of a successful takeover in the
Grossman-Hart solution is pi(∞, q) = Prob {(v, c) | v − q > c}. Thus, the optimization
problem of the Grossman-Hart manager is
max
q
(1− pi(∞, q))U(q). (17)
This optimization problem (17) is identical to the problem (9) faced by the manager in our
solution. Thus, the equilibrium values of q coincide in the two solutions. The conditions
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determining successful takeovers also coincide. Thus, all equilibrium values, including the
ex-ante firm value R, are identical, completing the proof.
A second weakness of the Grossman and Hart mechanism is its information require-
ments. Permissible bids in the model must meet (12), which depends on q. It is doubtful
if q may be regarded as even observable, let alone verifiable, by an outside entity such as a
court of law. This ad hoc lower bound is central to the Grossman-Hart solution. As they
note (footnote 8, p.47), if it is dropped, additional and inefficient equilibria arise under the
dilution rule.
Specifically, suppose v−φ < q. If the raider makes an offer p such that (v−φ)+ ≤ p < q,
there are two equilibrium continuations. In one, no one tenders and the raid fails. In the
other, all shareholders tender and receive (v − φ)+. As a consequence, there are two
equilibria of the game:
1. In the first equilibrium, shareholders reject any offer below q, the raider bids p = q
and all shareholders tender.
2. In the second equilibrium, the raider bids p = (v − φ)+ and all shareholders tender.
The second equilibrium involves inefficient outcomes. Takeovers in this equilibrium are
profitable for the raider whenever min{φ, v} > c. However, efficiency requires that tender
offers succeed if and only if v − c > q. These inequalities mean the same thing only if
v − q = min{φ, v}, which is impossible since v − φ < q implies v − q < min{φ, v}. In
particular, value-reducing bids succeed in this second equilibrium when min{φ, v} > c >
v − q.
Thirdly, even preserving the lower bound (12) on admissible offers, Bagnoli and Lip-
man (1988) identify an inefficiency with the Grossman-Hart solution in a finite-shareholder
setting if restricted offers are considered. Suppose v < φ and the raider makes a conditional
and restricted offer to buy exactly 50 percent of the shares at a price p = q. Assume that
pro-rating occurs if more than 50 percent of shares are tendered. Since v < φ implies all
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non-tendering shareholders receive zero, it is immediate that a strategy of everyone tender-
ing is a Nash equilibrium. The payoff to the raider in this equilibrium is v− q/2− c which
can be positive even if v < q; thus, value-reducing takeovers are possible.
Restricted or conditional offers do not, however, affect the efficiency of outcomes under
our freezeout rule (5). Under dilution, inefficiency arises because dilution enables the
raider to effect a wealth transfer from minority shareholders to himself, which subsidizes
the payment made to tendering shareholders. Under the freezeout rule, the “worst” damage
that can be inflicted on the minority shareholders is to buy them out at the price max{r, p}.
Wealth transfers from minority shareholders to the raider are infeasible, so value-reducing
takeovers become impossible.
IV. Exclusion, Takeover Premia, and Efficiency
The analysis above has the counterfactual implication that the takeover premium—the
excess of the tender offer over the pre-offer share price—is zero under the freezeout rule, as it
is also under the Grossman-Hart rule. This raises the question of how takeover premia may
be generated under exclusion and how this will affect the efficiency of the exclusionary rule.
We examine these questions here. The first part of the section discusses Fishman’s (1989)
model of multiple raiders and the second part looks at the moral hazard model of Burkart,
Gromb, and Panunzi (1998).
A. Multiple Raiders and Takeover Premia
Fishman’s (1989) model involves two raiders who move sequentially. Raider i must pay
a cost ci to identify the value vi of the firm to himself. Raiders’ valuations are private
knowledge, but their bids signal information about these quantities. Raider 1 moves first,
observes v1, and makes a tender offer. Raider 2 sees the offer and decides whether to pay c2,
observe v2, and then enter. If both raiders enter, an English-auction determines the final
outcome. If not, Raider 1’s bid stands and shareholders must decide whether to tender.
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Fishman eliminates free-riding by assuming that shareholders tender to the raider of-
fering the higher bid provided it exceeds a threshold value, but similar equilibria arise in
his model with our freezeout rule. In equilibrium, pre-emptive bidding by the first raider
and Bertrand competition if both raiders enter create a takeover premium.
Reflecting this takeover premium in expectation, equilibrium share prices r will exceed
q. This affects the efficiency of freezeouts. For expositional simplicity, we take the costs
ci to be zero in this discussion. Under our freezeout rule, an offer below r cannot succeed
since non-tendering shareholders are guaranteed at least r. If some raider values the firm at
more than r, then a takeover will occur at a tender price of at least r (the actual takeover
premium will depend on how many raiders enter). However, if all raiders’ valuations are
below r but at least one raider’s valuation satisfies q < v < r, no bid is made even though
v > q implies the takeover would be value improving.
This appears to suggest some inefficiency under freezeouts, but is actually indicative
of a more fundamental problem arising under any exclusionary device when r > q. Since
raiders will not make tender offers above v, the only way to ensure all value-improving
takeovers succeed, including those where r > v > q, is to guarantee the success of some
tender offers at prices p < r. Such negative takeover premia are, however, unreasonable
and unlikely to be legally feasible.
The definition of efficiency must therefore be revised to exclude this possibility. Call
a mechanism constrained efficient if takeovers succeed whenever they are value-improving
and do not involve negative premia, i.e., takeovers are attempted and succeed (at prices
p ≥ r) whenever v ≥ r. Constrained efficiency is the most one can expect if negative
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takeover premia are disallowed. It is clear from the above discussion that freezeouts are
constrained efficient.10
B. Moral Hazard, Takeover Premia, and Freezeouts
Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1998) describe a model with a single raider in which
takeover premia arise in the absence of freezeouts. They argue that introducing freezeouts
in this setting increases the takeover premium. We show below that this conclusion is
incorrect: freezeouts eliminate the takeover premium in this model, and result in outcomes
that are fully efficient.
Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi normalize q to zero; this ensures that only bids p ≥ q
occur since negative bids are not possible. The raider in their model can effect an increase
in firm value of up to v, but there is moral hazard after a successful takeover. The raider
may choose φ ∈ [0, 1] to extract private benefits of b(φ) v at the cost of increasing the firm
value by only (1−φ)v.11 Because of free-riding, shareholders tender only if the raider’s offer
equals the anticipated post-takeover value of the firm. Thus, the raider cannot profit on the
shares purchased through the tender offer. Nonetheless, a takeover may still be profitable
if the private benefits exceed costs; thus, moral hazard may resolve the free-riding problem.
The extraction of private benefits is assumed to be inefficient (b(φ) < φ) and this
creates an upward-sloping “supply curve” in tendering: Rational shareholders anticipate
that the larger the fraction of the post-takeover firm owned by the raider, the less the
private benefits extracted, and so the higher the post-takeover firm value. Thus, the tender
price pα at which the raider can buy a fraction α of the shares increases in α. It follows that
the raider’s gains are maximized when he buys the 50 percent minimum needed for control.
Since p50% > 0, there is a takeover premium in the sense that tendering shareholders receive
more than the firm is worth under incumbent management.
Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi then suggest that freezeout rules can increase both the
takeover premium and social welfare in this setting. Their arguments may be summarized
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as follows. Consider a freezeout mechanism in which non-tendering shareholders can be
frozen out at p but only if the raider owns at least a fraction f of the firm where f may be
larger than 50 percent.12,13 At least some raiders who earlier opted to stay out or to buy
50 percent of the shares (at a price of p50%) will now find it attractive to switch to paying
pf , buying f , and effecting a freezeout. When f > 50 percent, we have pf > p50% by the
arguments of the previous paragraph, so the takeover premium increases under freezeouts.
Social welfare also increases, since those raiders effecting a freezeout will own 100 percent
of the firm and so will not extract private benefits.
These arguments assume that the raider must pay pf to buy the fraction f necessary
to effect a freezeout. This appears incorrect: the supply curve pα is based on free-riding
considerations whereas free-riding is not a possibility under freezeouts. Indeed, regardless
of f , it is easily seen that the following is an equilibrium under freezeouts: the raider
makes an offer of  > 0 for arbitrarily small  and all shareholders tender. Free-riding by
not tendering is not an option since non-tendering shareholders are frozen out at the tender
price. This equilibrium is clearly preferable for the raider to all other alternatives. It is
efficient since the raider owns 100 percent of the firm. Thus, there are no takeover premia
in the Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi model under freezeouts, though freezeouts do increase
welfare.
V. The Legal Environment
Our proposed freezeout mechanism is consistent with both the law and the practice of
the treatment of non-tendered shares in the U.S. Tender offers are normally structured as
follows. A raider makes a tender offer p for all shares. The offer is conditioned on the raider
obtaining at least a majority voting control of the target. In the offer, the raider announces
that, as a second step after the offer is completed, the target will be merged into a shell
company, fully owned by the bidder. In that “freezeout” merger, the shares held by the
non-tendering shareholders are automatically converted into rights to receive the merger
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consideration (p) and the acquirer obtains full ownership of the target. For example, all 13
tender offers made by unaffiliated third parties for the stock of target companies between
January and May 2002 followed this pattern.14
This practice is sanctioned by law. The law specifically affords holders of a majority
of shares the power to approve freezeout mergers against the opposition of holders of a
minority of shares.15 Although minority shareholders enjoy certain legal protections, from
a practical perspective these protections offer non-tendering shareholders no effective legal
recourse against freezeout mergers that are structured as a follow-up to, and are on the
same terms as, a tender offer, i.e., at p in our notation.
We describe below the legal rights available to non-tendering shareholders—appraisal
rights and suits for breaches of fiduciary duties—focusing on the law of Delaware, where
well over half of public companies are incorporated. The law of other states does not differ
significantly from Delaware law. These legal rights protect shareholders against freezeouts
at a price below the pre-offer share price r. However, if the freezeout is at an offer price
p that exceeds r, these rights afford no recourse to obtaining higher compensation. This
leads to our freezeout rule max{p, r}.
A. Appraisal Rights
Shareholders are entitled to seek a judicial appraisal of their shares.16 In an appraisal
action, a shareholder receives the fair value of her shares as assessed by the court instead
of the consideration offered in the freezeout merger. Delaware law provides that this value
is to be assessed exclusive of any element of value arising from the accomplishment or
expectation of the merger.17 In practice, shareholders have no reason to expect that the
court’s appraisal will be larger than an offer price which exceeds the pre-offer share price.
Hence, appraisal rights do not provide effective recourse against a raider that pursues a
freezeout merger at such a tender offer price, and, indeed, shareholders hardly ever exercise
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their appraisal rights. The existence of this right, however, ensures that non-tendering
shareholders will not receive less than the pre-offer share price.
B. Suits for Breaches of Fiduciary Duty
Dissenting shareholders can challenge the freezeout merger by suing the raider for breach
of fiduciary duty. Such suits relate to self-interested transactions such as a freezeout merger
between the target and a company controlled by the raider. In practice, however, raiders
can and do insulate freezeout mergers against such challenges.
In a friendly tender offer, which happens in the great majority of takeovers (Schw-
ert (2000)), the raider normally negotiates the terms of the freezeout merger and signs a
merger agreement with the target’s board prior to making the offer. Since the raider does
not control the target at the time of signing the merger agreement, the agreement cannot
be challenged as self-dealing even though the raider will control the company by the time
shareholders vote on the merger.
Takeovers that start as hostile often end up being negotiated and the raider reaches
an agreement with the target’s board, which can insulate it from being sued by non-
tendering shareholders. But even if no merger agreement is signed prior to the tender
offer, it is difficult to challenge the merger if the merger consideration is equivalent to the
consideration in the tender offer. A court would give substantial weight to the fact that
a majority of target shareholders indicated their approval of the transaction by tendering
their shares. To our knowledge, there has been no instance in which a raider was held to
have violated its fiduciary duties by effecting a second step freezeout merger as a follow-up
to, and on the same terms as, a first step tender offer.
Finally, we note that legal regulation of controlling shareholders has not sanctioned
the kind of dilution suggested by Grossman and Hart. Such a transfer would constitute a
breach of the raider’s duty of loyalty and would subject the raider to legal sanctions.
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VI. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we define a specific freezeout mechanism that is consistent with the
law and practice of tender offers in the U.S. We show that our mechanism guarantees
desirable normative properties in the context of the Grossman-Hart (1980) model of a widely
dispersed firm as well as in several modifications of the model discussed in the literature
including large shareholdings, asymmetric information, post-takeover moral hazard and
risk-arbitrage. In all cases, our rule admits a unique equilibrium which is ex post efficient
(i.e., takeovers succeed if and only if the value of the raider-run firm exceeds its value
under current management) and ex ante firm-value maximizing. Our mechanism is also
superior to the Grossman-Hart alternative of dilution on several grounds including legal
admissibility, information requirements, and efficiency of outcomes.
A counterfactual implication of this analysis is that our mechanism, as also the Gross-
man-Hart dilution rule, generates a zero takeover premium. A positive takeover premium
arises if there is competition between raiders. In this case, our mechanism is constrained
efficient: Takeovers succeed when and only when at least one raider values the firm at
more than its pre-offer share price. No mechanism, including Grossman-Hart’s, can be
fully efficient here unless negative takeover premia are allowed.
Several open questions remain. One is to incorporate an active role for management
in the takeover process, such as the use of defensive measures in bargaining for a higher
offer price. A related issue concerns the impact of capital structure choices by incumbent
management and/or the raider. Third, since payoffs to non-tendering shareholders under
our mechanism depend on the pre-offer share price, there is a question of possible price
manipulation. Fourth, we showed that factors such as asymmetric information lack force
in the Grossman and Hart model under freezeouts; are there richer model structures under
which these factors have a non-trivial impact? Lastly, we have offered competition among
raiders as one possible explanation of takeover premia in the presence of freezeouts. The
identification of other possible explanations remains.
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Notes
1The freezeout mechanism in these papers differs from ours in some details. See Sec-
tions II.C and IV.
2Other work includes Yarrow (1985) on the role of freezeouts in resolving the free-rider
problem; Hermalin and Schwartz (1996) who present a model of freezeouts by controlling
shareholders and argue that awarding pre-freeze-out market price in an appraisal proceed-
ing creates efficient incentives to invest; Bebchuk and Hart (2001) who compare three
mechanisms—proxy fights, takeovers, and a combination of proxy fights and takeovers—in
corporate control contests; and Mueller and Panunzi (2003) who investigate the role of
debt-financing in takeovers and show that the raider’s incentives lead him to use more debt
than is socially optimal.
3The raider arrives with probability one, but bids only if it is profitable to do so (see
below); thus, his observed arrival depends on his valuation of the firm relative to its value
under current management.
4The common knowledge assumption is unnecessary for our freezeout mechanism. See
Section II.A for details.
5This formulation of the manager’s actions and preferences is from Grossman and Hart;
see there for further motivation and details. In general, management has two potential roles
associated with takeovers. One is creating value for existing shareholders (q in our model);
this is an important part of our analysis. The other is being agents of shareholders in the
takeover process. Intuition and empirical evidence (e.g., Long and Walkling (1984)) suggest
that managerial actions in this regard depend on the extent of alignment of management–
shareholder interests (though Schwert (2000) presents evidence suggesting that “hostility”
in takeovers may just be part of a bargaining process). As with much of the literature
on takeovers (including Grossman-Hart), our paper does not explicitly model the possible
misalignment of interests, so there is no role for management as representing shareholders.
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6There are formal technical problems in dealing with conditional or restricted offers in a
setting with a continuum of shareholders. See, e.g., Bagnoli and Lipman (1988, footnote 29).
We consider restricted offers in Section III in the context of a firm with a finite set of “large”
shareholders.
7Our paper examines tender offers and not mergers. In a tender offer, the decision on
tendering is made by individual shareholders. Fishman (1988, p. 53) suggests that in merg-
ers it is management instead that makes the accept/reject decision (though shareholders are
required by law to approve the merger subsequently). In a merger, the free-riding problem
is absent since stockholders will collectively vote in favor of a value-increasing offer, i.e.,
one where v ≥ q. Tendering after the merger is, however, still regulated by the freezeout
rule; see Section V.
8Allowing the freezeout rule to depend on r raises the concern of manipulation of share
price by either party. For the raider, a lower share price r is unambiguously better. For
shareholders, there is a trade-off: A higher share price provides a higher floor value from a
takeover but reduces the likelihood of a takeover. Formal modelling of this issue requires
introducing information sets and trading rules that take us well beyond the scope of this
paper.
9A tender offer of p in which non-tendering shareholders are frozen out at r ≤ p is similar
to two-tier offers. Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) show that such offers create pressure to
tender, overcoming the free-rider problem. Fair-price provisions (in corporate charters or
in state laws) requiring equal compensation for all shareholders, and other measures such
as poison pills, have made two-tier offers extinct in hostile tender offers.
10The Grossman-Hart mechanism too will result in r > q because of the Bertrand com-
petition among raiders. However, since feasible bids are required only to satisfy p ≥ q,
takeovers will succeed in this mechanism if at least one raider’s value exceeds q. This im-
plies that takeovers will succeed at negative premia. Outcomes no longer coincide under
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freezeouts and Grossman and Hart’s dilution since the likelihoods of takeovers succeeding
differ.
11The Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi model is thus akin to Grossman-Hart with costly
dilution, i.e., dilution of firm value of φv results in the raider receiving only b(φ) v with
b(φ) < φ.
12Since p ≥ q in this model, freezing out non-tendering shareholders at p is equivalent to
freezing them out at max{p, q}.
13Our rule sets f = 50 percent. Most U.S. states (including Delaware) use f = 50 per-
cent, though some such as Alaska and Texas set f = 2/3. Corporations can also impose
supermajority requirements through their charters but few do so: Coates (1998) reports
that of 1,500 S&P firms, fewer than 100 had such requirements.
14Source: Securities Data Corporation and the actual tender offers.
15In the first part of the 20th century, states permitted merger by majority vote, which
departed from the 19th century requirement of unanimous approval by all shareholders.
The aim was to facilitate corporate reorganizations that were called for by the economic
conditions of the day (Levy (1930)). At about the same time, Levy writes (pp. 420-421):
“. . . it was also realized that it was necessary to afford some relief to dissenters . . . The
result in most jurisdictions, was a compromise conferring on the dissenters the right to
receive the cash value of their stock and providing for an appraisal where no agreement
could be reached.”
16Appraisal rights are available in Delaware in cash mergers and in so-called short-form
mergers. To effect a short-form merger, the raider must own at least 90 percent of the
target’s stock after the tender offer.
17Delaware General Corporation Law, 262(h). In particular, the raider’s proposed strat-
egy for running the company does not affect the value awarded in the appraisal unless the
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raider begins to implement that strategy prior to the freezeout merger: See Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993).
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